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1. Abstract
Public transportation is an important part of the U.S. transportation system. After losing
popularity in the U.S. during the mid-20th century, public transportation has been making a
strong comeback in major metropolitan areas since the 1990s. In an effort to reduce inner-city
traffic congestion, promote environmentally sustainable development patterns, rejuvenate
decaying central business districts, and take advantage of all the other externalities of public
transportation (i.e., reduced air pollution, a smaller urban footprint reducing sprawl, etc.), urban
areas have been actively expanding their existing systems or building completely new systems.
Despite the strong interest in reinvesting in public transportation and a growth in ridership in real
terms, transit agencies in the U.S. have traditionally been plagued with low ridership relative to
other travel modes, and limited budgets, and often have operating deficits on an annual basis.
Governments at all levels, while supportive of expanding transit systems and willing to bear the
operating deficits, become fiscally strained during times of economic slowdown and have had to
shuffle transit investments with other public priorities. This can delay and indefinitely stop
transit investments for years, costing the public the benefits of public transportation.

A look into East Asian cities, namely Tokyo, Japan, and Hong Kong reveals a different approach
in funding public transportation. The model used in the two cities has been in use for decades
and has resulted in public transportation systems that are extensive and well-utilized. The model,
called R + P, involves transit operators acting as both the infrastructure operator and station area
designer, developer, and manager. The R + P model is institutionally different from that of the
U.S., and may hold lessons for U.S. policymakers when determining future financing
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arrangements for public transportation. R + P may aid in the eventual goal of establishing
extensive and heavily used transit systems in major U.S. metropolitan areas, and improve the
quality of life for the general public.
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2. Background
2.1.

The Competitiveness of Transit

For the last half of the 20th Century, U.S. has dedicated a substantial portion of its transportation
resources to the motor vehicle travel. While a great amount of resources have been committed to
other modes of transportation, such as intra-regional transit and airline travel, as shown in Figure
1, the number of passenger-miles traveled on each mode, shown in Table 1, demonstrates the
skew in utility that motor vehicle travel enjoys over other modes (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics [BTS], 2012; BTS, 2014). At its peak in 2008, highways expenditures were 3.59, 4.33,
16.28, and 141.30 times higher than expenditures in transit, air, water, and rail, respectively.

Millions of Fiscal Year 2012 Dollars

250,000

200,000

150,000

100,000

50,000

0
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Year
Highways

Air

Transit

Water

Rail

Figure 1. Transportation expenditures of all levels of government by mode. (BTS, 2012).
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Mode
Millions of Passenger-Miles Travelled in 2012 Percentage
Highway
4,274,877
86.93%
Air
580,501
11.81%
Transit
55,169
1.12%
Rail
6,804
0.14%
Total
4,917,352
100.00%
Table 1. U.S. Passenger-Miles by mode (Bureau of Transportation Statistics [BTS], 2014).

In 2012, highways dominated the transportation market with over 4.27 trillion passenger-miles
and 86.39 percent of the total miles traveled. Air travel made up the second largest portion of all
passenger travel, with over 580 billion passenger-miles travelled or 11.81 percent of the total.
Transit and rail, on the other hand, were relatively used much less. Just over 55 billion and 6.8
billion passenger-miles were travelled by transit and rail, respectively. Transit and rail
collectively made up only 1.26 percent of all passenger-miles travelled. It should be noted,
however, that because transit trips are largely characterized by intra-regional and intra-city trips,
the average distance travelled by each passenger will be relatively less than that of highway and
air users. Hence, the aggregate distance of transit users will be less. Figure 2 displays the
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Figure 2. Unlinked Passenger Trips on Transit Modes (roadway and fixed-guideway) from 1890 to 2013 (American
Public Transportation Association [APTA], 2015, pp. 20-27).

In Figure 2, transit enjoyed consistently high ridership figures in first two decades of the 20th
century. Ridership troughed in the 1930s (during the Great Depression) before cresting in the
early 1940s (during World War II). Ridership then slowly declined until the 1970s, and has
since slowly increased. While the reasons for the patterns presented in the above figures are
numerous, they can mainly be attributable to 1) large subsidies dedicated towards highway and
air travel infrastructure, 2) a decentralized pattern of urban form and density in major U.S. cities
that is not practicable for common transit use, and 3) a lack of uniformly good service and
accessibility to transit systems (Cranor, 2011; Walker, 2010; Dimitriou, 2001; Newman &
Kenworthy, 2006; Fishman, 2005, pp. 358-359). In particular, transit systems in U.S. cities are
not nearly as extensive as those in cities where public transit plays a major role in transportation.

2.2.

Interest in Transit Grows

Since the late 1990s, however, a small, but nonetheless significant shift in jobs and housing
flows from outer suburban rings to inner city centers has been occurring in a number of U.S.
metropolitan areas (Fishman, 2005, pp. 358-359). To illustrate, the New York regional core
(which includes the City of New York, Hudson, Essex, and Union Counties in New Jersey) lost
population (eight percent) and jobs (6.6 percent) between 1969 and 1990, while the outer
suburban ring region gained population (eleven percent) and jobs (56 percent) in the same period
(Fishman, 2005, p. 359). Yet, between 1990 and 2001, population growth in the regional core
“matched that of the ring for the first time since World War II” (Fishman, 2005, p. 359). In
terms of job gains, the core matched the suburban ring with nine percent growth between 1996
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and 2001 (Fishman, 2005, p. 359). A similar shift in growth patterns has been observed in other
U.S. cities such as Boston, San Francisco, Oakland, Chicago, and Los Angeles during the same
period (Fishman, 2005, p. 359). While the reasons for these shifts are not explicitly known,
Dutzik, Inglis, & Baxandall (2014, pp. 1-3) provides several insights, including a shift in
millennial’s (those born between 1983 and 2000) lifestyle preferences towards urban and
walkable neighborhoods, and transportation using a variety of modes in order to save on fuel
expenditures and to spend more time using portable technology devices. Cities and states are
also aware of the importance of having an adequate transportation system to induce social and
economic transactions of their citizenry (Harriet, Poku, & Emmanuel, 2013, p. 225). These
transactions generally aggregate and contribute to economic growth and an increase in standard
of living. As the former mayor of Bogotá noted, however, “[t]ransport differs from other
problems developing societies face, because it gets worse rather than better with economic
development” (Suzuki, Murakami, Hong, & Tamayose, 2015, p. 2). As societies develop,
people’s wealth and incomes increase, and their choice of travel shifts from non-motorized
modes to motorized modes, in particular the automobile (Suzuki, Murakami, Hong, &
Tamayose, 2015, p. 2). Since urbanized areas are by nature limited in space (Walker, 2012, p.
17), and automobiles are inherently spatially inefficient, congestion becomes a common
occurrence in developed cities (Norton, 2008, p. 139). Cities and states would be interested in
reducing congestion since it negatively affects economic development. In 2011, there was 38
hours of delay and 19 gallons of fuel wasted per capita in the U.S. (Schrank, Eisele, & Lomax,
2012, p. 1). Finally, it is becoming increasingly recognized by policymakers and the general
public that transportation systems contribute greatly towards environmental degradation and the
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release of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere (United States Department of
Transportation [DOT], 2010, p. ES-2; Cranor, 2011).

Because of the above discussed reasons, there has been a renewed interest in investing in public
transportation in the U.S. Cities such as Washington, D.C., Los Angeles, and Denver are
expanding their existing transit systems, while other cities including Dallas, Salt Lake City,
Phoenix, and Charlotte have recently completed brand new systems (Neff & Dickens, 2013, p.
11). Figure 3 displays the trend of passenger-miles by transit mode in the United States between
1990 and 2012.

25,000
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5,000
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Figure 3. Passenger-miles by transit mode in the U.S. (BTS, 2014).
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Minus a large dip in the mid-1990s, the utilization of buses (which includes motor buses and
trolley buses) has remained relatively steady for the last 20 years at around 20 billion passengermiles. Heavy rail, on the other hand, has experienced a remarkable increase in usage. The
number of passenger-miles has increased from 11.48 billion in 1990 to 17.52 billion in 2012,
representing a 53 percent increase. Light rail has also enjoyed an increase in usage, from 571
million passenger-miles to over 2.3 billion passenger-miles in 2012. This is a 306 percent
increase in the number of passenger-miles. When compared to highways and air travel, the
transit utilization gains are still minimal, but an independent comparison of transit modes shows
that significant ridership gains have been realized.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the increase in ridership is
attributable to “population increases, periods of growth in employment, and increases in gasoline
and parking prices” (2010, p. 8). Transit agency officials have noted as well that ridership
increases occurred due to transit agencies “expanding and enhancing their systems, adding new
service, forming local partnerships, and launching marketing campaigns to increase ridership”
(GAO, p. 8). Another factor that has led to an increase in ridership over the years is an active
approach by transit agencies to increase the potential number of riders working, living, and
shopping near their lines by engaging in joint development and encouraging transit-oriented
development (TOD) in their station areas.

The increase in ridership, however, has required transit agencies to ramp up service and invest in
line improvements to accommodate the extra demand. This has resulted in an increase in
operating and capital costs for transit agencies. The GAO noted that “because public transit
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riders do not pay for the full cost of their rides through passenger fares and revenues have not
kept pace with operating costs, increased ridership has strained . . . transit system[s’] operating
budget[s]” (2010, p. 13). Additionally, expansions of public transit systems, especially those that
utilize dedicated rights-of-way, are known to require huge amounts of public funds (Cabanatuan,
2014; Richards, 2013). After construction, such systems typically require ongoing subsidies
because farebox revenues cover only a portion of their operating costs. Figure 4 shows the
percentage of each funding source for operating expenditures.

38%

40%
35%

Percentage

31%

29% 30%

30%

26%

25%
20%
20%
15%
10%
5%

9%

7%

6%

4%

0%
Federal

State

Local

Other

Fares

Funding Source
1998

2008

Figure 4. Funding sources for U.S. transit operations expenditures. (GAO, 2010, p. 14).

The proportions of funding increased at all government levels between 1998 and 2008, indicating
a strong commitment to investing in public transit. Nevertheless, the share of funding from other
sources (e.g., advertising revenue) and fare revenue decreased. With other funding sources and
fare revenues covering only 47 percent and 37 percent of funding for 1998 and 2008
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respectively, it seems that there is a chronic funding shortfall for transit operations. Figure 5
presents the contribution of each funding source to transit capital projects.

60%
50%

47%

50%
40%

39%

Percentage

40%
30%
20%
12% 12%
10%

0%

1%

0%

0%
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Federal
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Local

Other

Fares

Funding Source
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2008

Figure 5. Funding sources for U.S. transit capital expenditures. (GAO, 2010, p. 15).

While the percentage of state funding remained static, federal funding declined while local
funding increased between 1998 and 2008. Other funding sources contributed one percent to
capital expenditures in 2008, while fare revenues contributed zero percent in both 1998 and
2008. In essence, transit capital expenditures are almost entirely dependent on public
investments. Table 2 shows the farebox recovery ratio (i.e., fare revenues divided by operating
expenditures) for 16 U.S. transit agencies in 2012. The transit agencies are ranked according to
greatest operating expenditures.
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Ratio of Fare Revenues to Operating Expenditures of North American Transit Agencies for 2012
Rank
1
2
4
3
6
5
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Operator (State)
NYCT (NY)
NJ Transit (NJ)
MBTA (MA)
WMATA (DC)
LACMTA (CA)
CTA (IL)
MTA LIRR (NY)
SEPTA (PA)
MTA-MNCR (NY)
MUNI (CA)
King County Metro (WA)
Metra (IL)
MTA (MD)
BART (CA)
DART (TX)
DTPW (PR)

Fare Revenues
$3,622,833,825
$891,835,082
$472,185,325
$714,512,997
$359,058,439
$551,162,509
$581,408,370
$451,094,843
$588,121,687
$202,266,632
$181,315,403
$298,394,322
$137,905,520
$366,474,018
$61,614,860
$44,904,968

Operating Expenditures
$6,685,391,347
$1,890,514,517
$1,295,890,428
$1,513,176,930
$1,245,808,764
$1,283,092,210
$1,163,468,650
$1,163,326,950
$945,225,586
$646,619,295
$630,539,306
$627,591,444
$597,623,138
$488,882,256
$450,030,313
$45,951,173

Ratio
0.54
0.47
0.36
0.47
0.29
0.43
0.50
0.39
0.62
0.31
0.29
0.48
0.23
0.75
0.14
0.98

Table 2. Ratio of fare revenues to operating expenditures of North American Transit Agencies in 2012. (National
Transit Database [NTD], 2013).

As Table 2 shows, none of the transit agencies’ fare revenues covered their operating
expenditures. The transit agency with the highest farebox recovery ratio of 0.75 was the San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Authority (BART), while the Dallas Area Rapid Transit
Authority (DART) had the lowest recovery ratio of 0.14. The Department of Transportation and
Public Works of Puerto Rico is included as an outlier with a recovery ratio of 0.98. In order to
understand the fiscal situations of the transit agencies in more detail, Table 3 and Table 4 display
the operating revenues and operating margins by mode in 2012. Note that in Table 3 and Table
4, the modes under “railway” include street car rail, light rail, commuter rail, heavy rail, hybrid
rail, and cable cars. The modes under “bus” are motor bus, trolleybus, commuter bus, and bus
rapid transit. The “other” modes include demand response, vanpool, taxi, and ferryboat.
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North American Transit Agencies Operating Revenues and Statistics in 2012
Railway Revenues
Operator

NYCT (NY)
NJ Transit
(NJ)
MBTA (MA)
WMATA
(DC)
LACMTA
(CA)
CTA (IL)
MTA LIRR
(NY)
SEPTA (PA)
MTA-MNCR
(NY)
MUNI (CA)
Metra (IL)
King County
Metro (WA)
DART (TX)
MTA (MD)
BART (CA)

Passengermiles (million)
12,189.81

Million
2012
dollars
2,742.05

3,082.68

Bus Revenues

76%

Million
2012
dollars
870.48

528.74

59%

1,845.57

376.15

2,017.10

Other Revenues

Total Operating
Revenues
Million
2012
Percentage
dollars
3,622.83
100%

24%

Million
2012
dollars
10.30

358.22

40%

4.87

1%

891.84

100%

80%

85.43

18%

10.61

2%

472.19

100%

569.24

80%

137.45

19%

7.82

1%

714.51

100%

2,117.18

71.44

21%

272.57

79%

-

-

344.01

100%

2,266.25

262.54

48%

288.62

52%

-

-

551.16

100%

2,083.40

581.41

100%

-

-

-

-

581.41

100%

1,632.22

261.38

58%

183.67

41%

6.05

1%

451.09

100%

2,438.20

587.49

100%

0.41

0%

0.22

0%

588.12

100%

468.71
1,681.88

70.64
298.39

35%
100%

130.33
-

64%
-

1.29
-

1%
-

202.27
298.39

100%
100%

576.54

14.49

8%

155.17

86%

11.65

6%

181.32

100%

472.43
818.31
1,545.72

25.81
60.27
366.47

42%
44%
100%

32.53
75.08
-

53%
54%
-

3.28
2.55
-

5%
2%
-

61.61
137.91
366.47

100%
100%
100%

Percentage

Percentage

Percentage
0%

Table 3. Operating revenues of transit agencies in North America. (NTD, 2013).
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Operator

NYCT (NY)
NJ Transit (NJ)
MBTA (MA)
WMATA (DC)
LACMTA (CA)
CTA (IL)
MTA LIRR
(NY)
SEPTA (PA)
MTA-MNCR
(NY)
MUNI (CA)
Metra (IL)
King County
Metro (WA)
DART (TX)
MTA (MD)
BART (CA)

Operating Profits and Loss of North American Transit Agencies in 2012
Railway
Bus
Other
Operating
Operating
Operating Income
Income in
Operating
Income in
Operating
in millions of 2012
millions of
Margin
millions of 2012
Margin
dollars
2012 dollars
dollars
(1,002.03)
-37%
(1,631.49)
-187%
(429.04)
(472.89)
-89%
(454.02)
-127%
(71.77)
(407.51)
-108%
(302.43)
-354%
(113.77)
(274.42)
-48%
(428.35)
-312%
(95.89)
(235.59)
-330%
(651.94)
-239%
(252.47)
-96%
(479.46)
-166%
-

Operating Income
in 2012 dollars

Operating
Margin
-4163%
-1472%
-1072%
-1225%
-

(3,062.56)
(998.68)
(823.71)
(798.66)
(887.53)
(731.93)

(582.06)

-100%

-

-

-

-

(582.06)

(242.88)

-93%

(426.10)

-232%

(43.25)

-716%

(712.23)

(353.18)

-60%

(0.83)

-205%

(3.09)

-1387%

(357.10)

(170.78)
(329.20)

-242%
-110%

(256.37)
-

-197%
-

(17.20)
-

-1329%
-

(444.35)
(329.20)

11.70

81%

(332.29)

-214%

(59.86)

-514%

(380.44)

(135.99)
(133.69)
(122.41)

-527%
-222%
-33%

(210.07)
(256.19)
-

-646%
-341%
-

(42.36)
(69.83)
-

-1292%
-2740%
-

(388.42)
(459.72)
(122.41)

Table 4. Operating margins of transit agencies in North America. (NTD, 2013).
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From Table 3, the distribution of fare revenues from railways and bus revenues seems to display
no pattern. For some transit agencies, the fare revenues from each mode is almost evenly
divided, while for other agencies, the figures are skewed with either railways or buses generating
most of the revenues. Revenues from other modes are meager for all of the transit agencies. In
addition, from Table 4, almost every mode under every transit agency operates at a loss (i.e.,
based on revenue from fares). The highest operating margin of railways is negative 33 percent
for BART, while the lowest is negative 527 percent for DART. For buses, the highest operating
margin is negative 127 percent for NJ Transit, while the lowest is negative 646 percent for
DART. With other modes, the highest operating margin is negative 514 percent at King County
Metro, while the lowest is negative 4,163 percent at New York City Metropolitan Transportation
Authority (NYCT). Railways under King County Metro have the only positive operating
margin. This figure is a bit misleading as King County Metro does not carry out rail operations
itself, but is contracted out by the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound
Transit) to run Link light rail service. Overall, NYCT had the highest operating deficit at over
$3.06 billion, while BART had the lowest operating deficit at over $122 million.

While the arguments that for a given level of service, transit can handle extra passengers more
cheaply than automobiles (Small, 1997, p. 674) and that rail subsidies are actually lower than
automobile subsidies on a passenger-mile basis when considering both direct costs and indirect
costs (Cranor, 2011) are valid, the reality is that governments can only spare a certain amount of
available cash towards public transit expansions and operating subsidies in light of other public
expenditures. This limitation of funds can slow down and delay the expansion and
improvements to public transit systems until more funds become available.
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3. Premise
3.1.

Problem

While the U.S. has invested substantial public funds in transit and passenger railway systems,
such systems continually perform with negative operating margins, or deficits. This makes it
difficult for such systems to make modifications and improvements to services and amenities
that might increase their ridership. Additionally, the need to search for external sources of
operating funds forces transit agencies to compete for limited funds with other public
expenditures and puts them in a negative political light to taxpayers.

3.2.

Study Purpose

The purpose of this study is to explore and examine alternative institutional arrangements that
allow transit agencies and passenger railway companies to provide services on a profitable basis,
and therefore on a more competitive basis.

3.3.

Study Methodology

This study consisted of a literature review of the state of transit in the U.S. in terms of usage and
funding levels relative to other modes of transportation. Then, the institutional arrangements that
allow transit and railway operators in Japan and Hong Kong to operate on a profitable basis was
studied. Finally, key principles of the institutional arrangements and their implications for the
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U.S. are identified. Recommendations of policy are provided for transit agencies to take
advantage of the benefits of the alternative institutional arrangements.

14

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

4. Alternative Institutional Models
4.1.

Japan’s Private Railway Companies

A different situation from the U.S. in terms of passenger ridership and availability of funds for
transit agencies exists in East Asian cities, however. In Japan and in Hong Kong, transit
operators take a more commercial approach to their operations. In the case of Japan,

there are 149 private railway companies, 135 of which are engaged in passenger
transport. Of these 135, 15 are major companies. The total length of line operated by the
15 majors is 2,860 [kilometers (km)], or a mere 14 [percent] of the total length of line—
20,580 km—operated by the six [Japan Railways (JRs), which are the large privatized
railway companies in charge of operating the national rail network leftover from the now
defunct Japan National Railways (JNR)]. Nevertheless, the number of passengers carried
by the 15 majors is equivalent to 89 percent of the total number of passengers transported
by the six JRs, and their passenger-km reaches 45 percent of those of the six JRs. In
Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya, in particular, the 15 majors carry far more passengers than
the JRs (60 [percent] vs. 40 [percent]), showing that the principal field of activity of the
major private railway companies is big cities (Saito, 1997, p. 2).

How is this possible? Saito (1997, p. 3) attributes the success of the private railway companies
to four factors, which include 1) efficient management, 2) a large, high-density market, 3)
overcrowding during rush hours, and 4) business diversification. Saito (1997, p. 3) focuses on
15
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business diversification as a major factor to the railways’ success. Indeed, the railway
companies should not be thought of as just transportation businesses, but as major land
developers that provide a wide variety of services to people who live along their lines (Saito,
1997, p. 3). The history of private railway companies in Japan began in the late 19th and early
20th centuries, during which several railway booms (or rapid line extensions) occurred (Saito,
1997, p. 3). In the interest of nation building activities, such as transporting military goods, the
Japanese government nationalized 17 private railway companies in 1906-1907 to create the state
owned JNR (Saito, 1997, p. 3). The remaining private railway companies were allowed to
continue business as long as their operations did not interfere with that of JNR’s. Given this
situation, the private railway companies built lines that branched off from JNR’s main lines into
rural areas. They then “had to increase the population near their lines and attract as many
passengers as possible by creating entertainment near their lines” (Saito, 1997, p. 4). The first
company to do so was Hanshin, which constructed a tram line between Osaka and Kobe in 1905
and “developed residential areas, recreational facilities (spas, mountain-climbing sites, and
playgrounds)[, and department stores] along the line” to build ridership (Saito, 1997, p. 4).
Another extreme example is the Tokyu Group, which is “Japan’s largest private railway
company group with about 400 affiliated companies and more than 100,000 employees” (Saito,
p. 4, 1997). Tokyu originated as a real-estate development company and entered the railway
industry when it founded a railway company to build and operate a line that connected its
developments to downtown Tokyo (Saito, p. 4, 1997). Saito (p. 4, 1997) notes that Tokyu is a
special case because most private railway companies started off as railway companies and
branched into real-estate development and investment.
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The company constructed the Den-en-toshi Line with a length of 20.1 km (15 stations) in
the southwestern suburbs of Tokyo between 1963 and 1984. At the same time, it
developed Tama Den-en-toshi (Tama Garden City) with an area of about 5,000 [hectares
(ha)] by levelling a huge hill along the line. The population of the new town is now [as
of 1997] almost 500,000 (Saito, p. 4, 1997).

In 1977, the Den-en-toshi Line was connected with the Teito Rapid Transit Authority (TRTA)
subway line, allowing Tokyu trains to run right into central Tokyo (Saito, p. 4, 1997). Figure 6
displays a map of the Greater Tokyo Area and its railway network.

Figure 6. A map of the railway network in the Greater Tokyo Metropolitan Area. (“Tokyo Metro map kai,” 2013).
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Private railway companies in Japan have also engaged in industries besides railways and realestate development. This includes the operation of bus systems, taxis, and station area retail, and
is shown by the operating figures of the 15 major private railway companies in Japan presented
in Table 5 and Table 6.

18

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

Private Railway Company Operating Revenues and Company Statistics in 1994

Company

[Tokyo Area]
Tobu
Seibu
Keisei
Keio
Odakyu
Tokyu
Keikyu
Sotetsu
[Osaka area]
Kintetsu
Nankai
Keihan
Hankyu
Hanshin

Line
Length
(mile)

Passengermile
(million)

Railway Revenues
Million
2012
dollars

Percentage

Bus Revenues
Million
2012
dollars

Other Revenues

Percentage

Million
2012
dollars

Percentage

Total Operating
Revenues
Million
2012
Percentage
dollars

288.38
111.72
56.86
52.69
75.56
62.57
52.07
21.75

8,926.64
5,896.21
2,398.50
4,309.84
6,824.54
5,442.60
3,899.11
1,754.14

2,146.68
1,323.48
777.72
1,052.12
1,449.31
1,599.40
932.35
427.52

59%
39%
59%
59%
63%
40%
46%
21%

536.67
407.81
322.91
10.61
362.33
134.93

15%
31%
18%
0%
18%
7%

959.64
2,096.65
122.80
403.26
855.03
2,416.53
712.53
1,432.64

26%
61%
9%
23%
37%
60%
35%
72%

3,642.99
3,420.13
1,308.32
1,778.29
2,314.96
4,015.93
2,007.21
1,995.08

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

369.22
107.06
57.10
90.84
28.02

9,477.18
3,129.23
3,305.08
6,424.37
1,358.94

2,869.82
996.02
911.13
1,570.59
438.13

74%
56%
57%
58%
41%

154.63
186.47
81.86

4%
11%
8%

827.75
585.18
686.76
1,117.30
553.35

21%
33%
43%
42%
52%

3,852.20
1,767.68
1,597.88
2,687.90
1,073.34

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

335.11
75.25

4,544.10
1,298.05

1,241.62
385.07

55%
17%

338.07
1,141.56

15%
51%

683.72
724.66

30%
32%

2,263.41
2,251.28

100%
100%

4,661.54
1,232.49
3,150.42
100.79

79,625.19
30,762.92
34,476.24
9,868.02

28,384.38
16,964.22
12,968.01
3,958.32

96%
92%
98%
98%

-

-

1,244.65
1,459.92
281.98
63.67

4%
8%
2%
2%

29,629.03
18,424.15
13,249.98
4,021.99

100%
100%
100%
100%

[Nagoya/Fukuoka
areas]
Meitetsu
Nishitetsu
[Reference]
JR East
JR Central
JR West
TRTA

Table 5. Operating revenues of railway companies. Modified from (Saito, 1997, p. 5).
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Company

Tobu
Seibu
Keisei
Keio
Odakyu
Tokyu
Keikyu
Sotetsu
Kintetsu
Nankai
Keihan
Hankyu
Hanshin
Meitetsu
Nishitetsu

Operating Profits and Loss of Major Private Railway Companies in 1994
Railway
Bus
Other
Operating
Operating
Operating
Income in
Income in
Income in
Operating
Operating
Operating
millions of
millions of
millions of
Margin
Margin
Margin
2012
2012
2012
dollars
dollars
dollars
227.40
44%
(32.14)
-6%
325.79
63%
216.94
52%
197.39
48%
128.10
87%
(5.31)
-4%
24.56
17%
167.22
60%
(3.79)
-1%
114.91
41%
212.55
51%
2.43
1%
203.75
49%
309.12
49%
326.25
51%
148.27
55%
(10.01)
-4%
129.77
48%
68.83
28%
(16.07)
-7%
189.50
78%
243.17
51%
(21.68)
-5%
252.11
53%
122.49
44%
(18.95)
-7%
174.34
63%
100.66
49%
106.42
51%
132.35
42%
181.47
58%
41.84
22%
1.97
1%
142.20
76%
109.76
43%
(18.80)
-7%
166.46
65%
36.84
25%
11.67
8%
96.42
67%

Operating
Profit in
millions of
2012
dollars
521.05
414.33
147.36
278.34
418.72
635.36
268.03
242.26
473.60
277.89
207.09
313.82
186.02
257.42
144.93

Table 6. Operating profits for major private railway companies in Japan. Modified from (Saito, 1997).

The original numbers from Saito (1997, pp. 5-6) were converted from 1994 Japanese yen to 1994
US dollars, and then to 2012 US dollars using the Consumer Price Index (Forecast-Chart.com,
2012; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2014). From Table 5, it can be seen that some companies focus
their efforts on functions other than railways. Seibu, Tokyu, and Hanshin, for instance, have
chosen to focus their businesses on real-estate development and other services. Seibu and Tokyu
do not even operate buses. On the contrary, Keisei and Nishitetsu earn a respectable portion of
their revenues from bus operations. One key feature is that the railway branches of all the
companies more than make up for their operating expenditures, as shown in Table 6. The
highest operating profit on railway operating expenditures is 87 percent for Keisei, while the
lowest is 22 percent for Hanshin. Another feature to note is that branches of private railway
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companies that specialize in bus operations seem to either be marginally profitable or
unprofitable. It can be guessed that bus operations act as feeders and allow the companies to
attract patronage to their other services, thereby increasing operating profits for the branches that
provide those other services. Since it appears that bus operations generally pay for themselves,
there is little to no net loss to the companies’ overall operating margins. In general, the private
railway companies are able provide the important social service of transportation in a way that
does not strain local governments of their cash assets, but actually provides them with massive
tax revenues (Shoji, n.d. p. 3).

4.2.

Hong Kong’s Mass Transit Railway Corporation

In Hong Kong, a similar approach to transit operations is done by MTRC. MTRC is the main
transit operator for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR). Founded in 1975,
MTRC was solely state-owned until 2000, when 23 percent of its shares were sold to private
shareholders (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 8). The entrance of private shareholders
incentivized MTRC to adopt a more commercial and entrepreneurial approach to its operations
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 8). In particular, the company’s R + P program was accelerated
and broadened (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 8). In the R + P process, the Hong Kong
government gives exclusive development rights to MTRC around and above its station areas in
the form of land grants (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 10). MTRC then develops the land and
capitalizes on the premium, or the difference between the “before rail” price and “after rail”
price, that the land gains (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 10). In the U.S., this process is known
as “value capture.” Cervero & Murakami note that R + P has been lucrative enough for MTRC
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that it is able to cover the costs of railway investments and future line extensions without direct
financial help from the Hong Kong government (2008, pp. 11-14). For example, in the 1980s,
although MTRC was operating at a loss, income from its R + P projects curtailed some of the
losses (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13). In the 1990s, MTRC expanded its R + P program
and debt financed the construction of the Airport Line with income from R + P investments
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13). Additionally, revenue from R + P developments along the
Airport Line helped finance the construction of the Tseung Kwan O Line (Cervero & Murakami,
2008, p. 13). Figure 7 shows the MTRC Hong Kong railway network in 2009. As of 2014,
MTRC is planning the opening of seven new lines and extensions (MTR Corporation, 2014).
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Figure 7. MTRC network in Hong Kong SAR. (“Hong Kong MTR system map,” 2009).

Table 7 presents the type and size (in gross floor area [GFA]) of land development and
investment projects that MTRC has been involved with.
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Property Development Overview of MTRC in 2006
Type of Land
Use
Units
Urban Lines
Airport Line
Tweung
Kwan O Line
Total
Type of Land
Use
Units
Urban Lines
Airport Line
Tweung
Kwan O Line
Total

Residential

Commercial

Office

GFA (ft2)
Percentage
341,022.23
35%
308,386.05
32%

GFA (ft2)
Percentage
3,389,803.18
43%
3,300,645.70
42%

313,951.00

33%

1,138,972.49

963,359.28

100%

Hotel/Service Apartments
GFA (ft2)

Percentage
3,140,069.68
83%

GFA (ft2)
2,248,215.06
6,587,115.33

Percentage
25%
74%

53,819.56

1%

7,829,421.37
100% 8,889,149.94
Government &
Total
Institutions
GFA (ft2)
Percentage
GFA (ft2)
1,539,605.26
85% 7,518,645.73
266,622.08
15% 13,602,838.84

100%
Number of
Carparks
Spaces
6,012
14,360

625,706.15

17%

N/A

3,765,775.83

100%

1,806,227.34

15%

-

2,132,449.19

6,547

100% 23,253,933.76

26,919

Table 7. Overview of MTRC property development. Modified from (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 12).

Similar to the private railway companies in Japan, MTRC has also diversified its projects to
include “equity ownership, cash holdings, property management, consulting, advertising, and
ownership of other assets (e.g., telecommunications leases, [and] convenience retail shops)” in
order to be more robust against cyclical swings in the economy and earn revenues from a variety
of ventures (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 13). For example, between 2001 and 2005, MTRC
received revenues from property development (52 percent), railway fares (28 percent), property
investment and management (ten percent), and non-fare sources (ten percent) (Cervero &
Murakami, 2008, p. 13). In light of this, Cervero & Murakami also note that

MTRC has hardly been the sole financial beneficiary of R + P. Society at large reflected
by Hong Kong SAR’s majority ownership of MTRC, has also reaped substantial rewards.
For the 1980 to 2005 period, it is estimated that Hong Kong SAR has received nearly
$140 billion (in [2008] Hong Kong dollars[,or $19.17 billion in 2012 U.S. dollars]) in net
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financial returns. This is based on the difference between earned income ($171.8 billion
[or $23.53 billion in 2012 U.S.] from land premiums, market capitalization, shareholder
cash dividends, and initial public offer[ing] proceeds) and the value of injected equity
capital ($32.2 billion[ or $4.41 billion in 2012 U.S.]). Thus the government of Hong
Kong has enjoyed tremendous finance[ial] returns and seeded the construction of a
world-class railway network without having to advance any cash to MTRC. The $140
billion figure, of course, is only the direct financial benefit. The indirect benefits—e.g.,
higher ridership through increased densities, reduced sprawl, air pollution, and energy
consumption, etc.—have increased net societal returns well beyond $140 billion (2008, p.
14).

Again, as in Japan, Hong Kong has enjoyed the expansion and operation of a high quality transit
system that hardly burdens the local government of any resources.

4.3.

The Connection between Transportation and Land Use

While the financial successes that MTRC in Hong Kong and Japanese private railway companies
have enjoyed are great, it should be noted that their achievements were possible because they
took advantage of a relationship between transportation and land use. This relationship is known
as the transportation-land use dynamic, and is presented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8. The transportation-land use dynamic. (Giuliano, 1995, p. 307).

Giuliano provides the following analysis of the dynamic:

The characteristics of the transportation system determine accessibility, or the ease of
moving from one place to another. Accessibility in turn affects the location of activities,
or the land use pattern. The location of activities in space affects daily activity patterns,
which in turn result in travel patterns (daily trips within the region). These travel
patterns, expressed as flows on the transportation network, affect the transportation
system (1995, p. 307).

What should be taken from the dynamic is that transportation and land use are interdependent.
For example, one should typically not wait until after an area has been developed to create a
transportation system because doing so may physically disturb the developments and cost more
than if the system had been planned and built before the developments. Similarly, one should
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not build a transportation system in an area where there are no developments or any
developments planned for in the future because its utility would be low. In general,
transportation and land use are interdependent and feed off of each other, and should be planned
together.

Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005) show a similar finding of the connection between
transportation (railway) and land use (property) in Figure 9. In this case, the connection is
related to the railway and property development model that MTRC and Japanese private railways
use.
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Figure 9. A model of the synergy between railways and property development. (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung,
2005, p. 3).

The integration of railway and property development, or R + P, is used to take advantage of the
fact that a single entity absorbs the externalities that are associated with transportation
investments and land developments. This integration results in two benefits: 1) Optimization of
the scale of both transportation investments and property developments and 2) the minimization
of transaction costs. Transportation investments typically involve huge upfront costs and need to
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be justified by a high expectancy of utilization after construction. Transit in particular operates
most efficiently only when patronage is very high. On the other hand, land developments are
often limited in scale because of the potential traffic congestion they might generate on a
transportation system. Roads and highways only have so much capacity, especially when the
majority of traffic is single-occupancy vehicles. In order to prevent congestion, they either need
to be widened to add more lanes, or have their surrounding land uses. With either option, the
effects on the environment are great as much land area is needed. When R + P is used, a single
entity plans for transit and land use in tandem and can balance the intensity of land use with high
capacity transit to maximize the utility and value capture from the entire investment.

It is also important to note the institutional relations that take place under R + P to optimize the
scale of transportation investments and property development. Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung
(2005, p. 7) depict two models of institutions regarding railway and property development in
Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Two models of railway and property development. (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 7).

Model A in Figure 10 represents a traditional model of railway and property development where
there is no lead institution undertaking the project. Under this model, “the statutory town plans,
land lease documents, . . . government land sale [programs], and . . . government policies and
regulations provide the principal coordinating mechanisms in bringing together all the key
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players in developing the sites” (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 8). Notice that the
arrows, representing a relation between two parties, do not all point to one place. In Model B,
MTRC is the lead coordinator between all of the relevant parties in a development. Tang,
Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005, p. 8) state that Model B

does not obviate the need for statutory town plans, land lease documents, government
policies and regulations, but unlike [Model A], they only frame rather than dictate all the
development particulars. The site development details are expected to be worked out by
the MTRC in negotiation and consultation with the government departments and the
developers. Exclusive development rights for the station sites are granted to the MTRC
and this provides an incentive for the corporation to plan and develop the sites in such a
way as to maximize the values of its entire development projects and “internalize” all
possible external benefits generated from railway and property development. The MTRC
provides the platform for the resolution of conflicting interests of all the relevant parties
in connection with the site development.

Although Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung’s models are specific to Hong Kong, the same
concept can be applied to Japan’s private urban railway companies with a slight modification in
that the companies are also developers. Nevertheless, in both cases, the scale of both
transportation and property developments are planned carefully to bring out the full potential of
the investments.
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R + P also minimizes the transaction costs between transportation and land use planning. It is
important to keep transaction costs low in order to increase the chance of success of a project.
Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005, p. 15) note that “conflicting objectives can be more
effectively resolved when the decisions are put under a company hierarchy,” turning a “zero-sum
game” between two conflicting parties into a “trade-offs” decision within a single firm. For
example, in a complex that includes a transit station and shopping mall, property planners would
want to design pathways so that as many pedestrians pass by and are retained by as many retail
shops as possible (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 14). On the other hand,
transportation planners would want to design pathways that provide for the smooth and quick
flow of pedestrians as much as possible (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 14). If the
two types of planning are done by different organizations, the costs of planning property and
transportation would be greater than if the two types of planning were done by the same
organization (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, p. 14). In another example, Mizutani &
Nakamura (2004, p. 308) discuss the reasons that Japan did not opt to vertically separate its
railways during the privatization of JNR. Vertical separation of railways, a policy that the
European Union promotes through EU Directive 91/440, generally refers to the separation of
responsibilities of train operations and right-of-way maintenance to different entities and allows
for the open access of train operations in order to entice competition (EU Directive 91/440,
2014). Instead, Japan opted to vertically integrate its railways (i.e., trains are operated and the
right-of-way is maintained by the same entity).

[A]s the case of British Rail indicates, the division of track from trains becomes
problematic because an adversarial relationship has developed between the central track
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authorities and the train-operating companies. Problems associated with vertical
separation include high transaction costs, a need for monitoring of the other’s
performance, the difficulty in creating complex performance schedules, and the
stimulation of incentives for the track authority to invest in new facilities to increase
efficiency and improve safety (Mizutani & Nakamura, 2004, p. 308).

While vertical separation is intended to encourage railway operators to reduce their costs from
competition with other operators, the high transaction costs of vertical separation may actually
diminish some of the savings from competition. In general, “[t]he transaction costs in reaching a
settlement within a firm are much lower than between separate companies,” and R + P manages
to reduce the transaction costs between different entities involved in a transit and property
development project.

4.4.

Station Area Partnerships

It would be of interest to look at the arrangements of station area management in R + P. Among
the stakeholders, who pays for what, and who manages what in a transit station after opening
likely affects the success of an R + P project. In the case of North America, it was stated by Hall
& Weeks (2014, metropolitan planning meeting) that transit agencies usually do not engage in
property development or investment directly because of their lack of expertise in the practices.
Property development and investment are most commonly procured through sub-contracting
with private sector stakeholders. In Japan, the entire process of R + P, from purchasing the land
to developing station areas is handled by private railway companies and their subsidiaries with
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some financial help from the national government. A look into MTRC’s approach, however,
may give a better understanding to how transit operators in North America can benefit more
directly from their investments.

As mentioned above, MTRC is jointly-owned by the public and private shareholders. This gives
it the incentive to maximize the return from its investments and adjust to changing market
conditions from commercial principles, while also preserving the public interest in its
investments (Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung, 2005, pp. 8-11). Within the station area, MTRC
takes the role of planning and coordinator of development, transit operator, and property
manager. According to Tang, Chiang, Baldwin, & Yeung (2005, p. 11),

[d]evelopers agree to offer a sharing of their profits from the above-station development
projects [(i.e., air-rights development)], when the MTRC invites them for tender. The
MTRC is required to shoulder both development as well as financial risks in this process
as the profit sharing is highly sensitive to the market conditions . . . . [T]he corporation is
required to pay full [“after rail”] market premiums to the government for the property
development rights. The market premiums are [then] levied on the property developers
who are susceptible to the market environment.

Put another way, the Hong Kong government assists MTRC in acquiring right-of-way and
station areas at a price that does not reflect accessibility to transit service (i.e., “before rail”
price). Upon construction of the transit infrastructure and station area development, the Hong
Kong government demands the added value of the land from accessibility to transit service (i.e.,
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“after rail” price) from MTRC, which MTRC demands from the developers. Under this system,
MTRC is the entity that assumes the risk from the project, rather than the central government or
developers. There are two benefits that result from this. Firstly, since MTRC is the master
planner and designer of the station area, MTRC will want to make sure that the station area is
designed in such a way to encourage as much transit ridership and high occupancy rates of
developments as possible. To do this,

[b]y means of “Development Agreements,” the MTRC will control, monitor and
supervise [the] implementation of the adopted master plan proposals of the station
development by the developers which have won the subject tender. The Development
Agreements stipulate, in great details, the conditions, responsibilities and duties to be
fulfilled by the developers as the implementation agent of the MTRC. Most developers
describe the conditions of Development Agreements as very “harsh.” Nonetheless, the
Development Agreements perform an important function in ensuring that good quality
development product will come out in the end.

Secondly, as MTRC is both the transit operator and property manager of the station area after
construction, it will be encouraged to maintain transit service and the station area property in as
good of a state as possible to retain patronage. Figure 11 and Table 8 show the responsibilities
that separate stakeholders in a MTRC station area project assume.
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Figure 11. The components of a station area development with MTRC. (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 72).

Project Components
1) Construction
2) Mechanism for
sharing costs & profit

3) Ownership of asset
4) Management

Residential
Towers

Mall and
Retail
Bridge

Office

Hotel

Town Square

Government and
Community

Public Transport
Interchange

Developer based on railway/ development coordinated design; enabling works provided by MTRC (multiple packages)
Developer paid land premium and development
cost
Part of the property design
Conditions in land grant
Investment return split by up-front profit and endprofit sharing
Common area of the mall
Individual flat
Developer
and Public Transport
Government
owners
Interchange
Hotel
Government delegated to operator
MTRC
Developer
Developer
operator
(MTRC)

Table 8. The partnership responsibilities in a station area development project. Modified from (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 72).
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Note that Figure 10 and Table 8 present only one example of an arrangement between station
area project stakeholders. Each station may have a different arrangement. Also, the public
transport interchange is the area immediately outside of the transit station area that facilitates
transfer between different modes of transportation. In the case of Japanese private railway
companies, it is likely that the arrangement is very similar to that of MTRC, except that more
responsibilities fall to subsidiaries of the main company.

To demonstrate the quality of transit service, depending on the line and time of day, MTRC can
have train headways range from about 20 minutes to as low as two minutes (MTRC, 2014). The
Tokyo Metro, formerly known as TRTA, operates one of two subway systems in central Tokyo
(the other being Toei Subway), serving 179 stations on nine lines that make up a network of
121.2 miles (Tokyo Metro, 2014). Along with its own trains, many Japanese private railway
companies operate through-service trains coming from Tokyo’s suburbs on Tokyo Metro’s lines,
resulting in train headways that range from a high of six minutes at off-peak hours to a low of
one minute and 50 seconds at peak hours (Kimura, 2013, p. 10).

A discourse on station area design also reveals a difference in thinking and extent of the function
of stations between North America and other parts of the world. Arcady, quoted by Tillier
(2009), states:

There’s a big difference in philosophy between European and American station design.
In Europe, the trains are within the overall architectural space defined by the station, in
the grandest examples a big steel and glass arch covering the tracks and platforms. In
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America, the station is separate and distinct from the tracks, which are off to the side in
what is basically a train yard. In Europe, passengers wait on the platform, and it’s not
unusual to see, say, a coffee shop right on the platform. In America, probably because of
the tradition of low platforms and train-yard style stations, trains and passengers are kept
separate until it’s actually time for boarding, at which point the passengers go out of the
station and to the train, oftentimes walking directly across other tracks. Hence, in even
the grandest of US stations (Grand Central for example), the track area is generally ugly
and utilitarian.

A picture of the main railway station in Berlin, Germany, taken by Ephemeron 1 (2008) and
presented by Tillier (2009), furthers the point of the above discussion in Figure 12.
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Figure 12. Berlin’s main railway station. (Ephemeron 1, 2008).

The point presented by Tillier (2009) is that train stations outside of North America function not
only as transportation nodes, but also as commercial and social centers in their spheres of
influence. This dual function is reflected in the urban design and orientation of the station,
which often is built within the same building of a large commercial-hotel-residential complex.
This is in contrast to North American examples where the station is off to the side and distinctly
separate from other developments, as shown in Figure 13 and Figure 14.
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Figure 13. An example of joint development. In both cases, the station is off to the side. (GAO, 2010, p. 6).

Figure 14. “Transit-Adjacent Developments” around Valley Transit Authority light rail in San Jose, California.
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 27).

While reasons for the compartmentalization of North American station are not explicitly known,
three reasons for this phenomenon can be guessed at. Firstly, the United States is a country of
huge expanse, relative to many Western European and East Asian countries. Stations could
therefore be built on larger plots that afforded the luxury of compartmentalizing functions and
separating waiting areas from platform areas. Secondly, train service in the United States has
generally not been known to operate at high frequencies (number of trains per hour), meaning
that headways (time between trains) can be much greater than that of other countries. Thus, as
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demonstrated by Amtrak, trains in the United States may spend several minutes boarding
passengers. This allows enough time for passengers in the waiting area to walk over to the
platform area and board their train, whereas on train systems where trains can afford to only
spend less than a minute boarding passengers, passengers are allowed to wait on the platform so
that they are closer to the train, and hence take less time boarding the train. Finally, in the case
of intercity rail, noise generated by the propulsion unit of trains can be a nuisance to waiting
passengers. As Figure 15 shows, at lower speeds, diesel-electric propulsion tends to emit
considerably more noise at lower speeds relative to electric traction propulsion. This is
explained by the fact that at lower speeds, locomotive exhaust noise and air conditioning unit
noise dominates as ambient noise. As speeds increase, noise from the interaction of the rails and
wheels and air turbulence noise begins to overwhelm other noise sources (FTA, 2006, pp. 2-6–27).
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Figure 15. Relative sound levels emitted according to relative speed. (FTA, 2006, p. 2-6).

It can also be noted that the intensity of the land uses around a station can affect the potential
demand of ridership, encouraging MTRC and Japanese private railways to develop their station
areas to extremely high densities. Figure 16 shows Tung Chung Station along the MTRC line.
A central plaza with urban design elements exists outside of Tung Chung station. In addition,
high-density residential developments are visible near the station.
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Figure 16. Tung Chung Station and surrounding developments. (Hokachung, n.d.).

Tung Chung Station opened in conjunction with a line of the same name in 1998. Judging by the
land use data presented in Table 9, the station serves a predominantly residential neighborhood.
This, as well as the fact that the station is only 35 minutes away from the central business
district, suggests that ridership patterns at the station exhibit those of bedroom communities (i.e.
high peaking at rush hours) (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16). 51,303 passengers per day
use the station (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16).
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Tung Chung R + P Station Area
Land Use Make-up GFA (ft2) Percentage
Residential
935,910
91.0%
Office
14,999
1.5%
Hotel
55,862
5.4%
Others
22,000
2.1%
Total
1,028,771
100%
Parking Spaces
3,869
Table 9. Statistics on the Tung Chung Station Area. Modified from (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16).

Most of the housing is located within 80 meters (262.47 feet) of the station (Cervero &
Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16). 26.7 percent of the housing is private (Cervero & Murakami, 2008,
p. A2-16). With a gross floor area of 103.08 hectares and site area of 21.70 hectares, the floorto-area ratio for the station area is 4.75 (Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. A2-16). Note that this is
on the low side of floor-to-area ratios for R + P projects, with the highest reaching 14.84
(Cervero & Murakami, 2008, p. 39).

Figure 17 displays station area property developments by the Tokyu Group around Shibuya
Station in Tokyo. Shibuya Station first opened in 1885 to serve the western portion of Tokyo
(Shibuya Station, 2014). Today, the station serves as one of the main transfer points between the
western and southwestern suburbs of Tokyo and central Tokyo (Shibuya Station, 2014). The
station is served by five railway operators on five separate lines and has an average count of over
3.06 million passengers per day, making it Japan’s fourth-busiest railway station (Shibuya
Station, 2014). Figure 18 shows a bus facility outside Shibuya Station. The left side of the
photo shows one of the train lines entering the station complex.
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Figure 17. Station area developments by the Tokyu Group. (Tokyu Group, 2013).
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Figure 18. Outside of Shibuya Station in Tokyo, Japan. (“Shibuya Station West Exit Bus Terminal,” n.d.).

The potential for station area design is very high for North America.

4.5.

Lessons for the U.S.

After a review of the literature on value capture, joint development and transit-oriented
developments in North America, it became evident that most of the literature does not discuss the
integration of transit operations and property development to the extent of the R + P process, but
rather focused on coordination (Wolf & Symington, 2009; GAO, 2010; Federal Transit
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Administration [FTA], 2013; Becker, Bernstein, & Young, 2013; Central Puget Sound Regional
Transit Authority [Sound Transit], 2014). The GAO stated that “[s]pecifically, transit agencies
are responsible for building, maintaining, and operating transit, but need to coordinate with local
and state governments that generally have authority over taxation, land use, and development”
(2010, p. 23). Wolfe & Symington (2009) noted that one of the challenges to implementation of
transit projects is the lack of common interests from various stakeholders. It was suggested that
in large regions a consolidation of multiple agencies that have the authority to issue permits into
one regional government might improve coordination between the sub-regions (Wolfe &
Symington, 2009, p. 33). Wolfe & Symington (2009, p. 33) also proposed that a “greater level
of regional coordination or consolidation” of seven transit agencies in the four-county Seattle
metropolitan region “could improve service, planning and reduce overhead costs.” However,
Wolfe & Symington (2009) did not mention combining the different types of roles into one
entity. Most of the literature assumed that the transit agency is relegated to just the
responsibilities of ownership and operation of transit facilities. Also, design of station areas was
master planned not by the transit agency, but by local governments. Finally, property
development and investment was left to private developers and property owners. As a note,
coordination between agencies with different roles may not be as effective as integrating select
roles into a single agency because of transaction costs, as discussed above. On a tour of Sound
Transit’s light rail extension projects (i.e. East Link and University Link), a representative of
Sound Transit was asked if Sound Transit would engage in management and investment of
property developed around the new transit stations. The representative responded that “We like
to stick with doing the ‘T’ in TOD” and that it would not be in the interest of Sound Transit as a
public agency to engage in property development or investment (2014). Furthermore, the
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representative stated that property development and investment should be left to the private
sector (2014). From this answer, there seems to be a general reluctance of transit agencies in
North America to admittedly engage in commercial activities and privatization. The source of
this reluctance is not known. A review of a draft FTA circular on guiding joint development for
transit agencies contained no restrictions of transit agencies engaging in commercial activities,
minus using FTA awarded funds for specifically supporting commercial activities (2013). In
fact, the circular appeared to encourage private stakeholder involvement in joint development
projects. The FTA circular states:

While the statute prohibits FTA from outfitting a commercial space, FTA funds may be
used to construct the “shell” of a facility that will be occupied by a commercial entity, as
long as the statutory eligibility criteria are met. To illustrate, FTA funds could be used to
construct a facility that would be occupied by a coffee shop or news stand in exchange
for rent payments. FTA could assist in the construction of the overall facility that
includes the commercial space, but could not pay for seating in the commercial areas,
shelving, countertops, or other commercial equipment. (Note: as discussed above,
occupants of a facility must pay a fair share of the costs of the facility through rental
payments or other means) (2013, p. III-9).

Clearly, FTA does not discourage commercialization. Shoji (n.d., pp. 2-3), however, provides
the following analysis:
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A public transport system has two basic objectives that it is expected to achieve
simultaneously—to serve the public interest and to be profitable [(or, at least to be cost
effective given the public investment)]. However, the two objectives can sometimes be
in conflict. In such cases, the policy must focus either on the public interest or on
profitability. The choice significantly determines how the system evolves because any
improvements will be based on the chosen principle. For example, the operator may
choose to promote mobility and accessibility by striving to develop and maintain a
system that is fair to society as a whole while respecting budgetary limitations. Or the
operator may promote commercial objectives according to the self-supporting principle
while making exceptions in special cases.

As described above, the general worldwide trend has been for urban public transit
systems to take the first approach. This has helped maintain public transit systems that
offer relatively low fares and generate large networks. However, the public-interest
approach has led to several problems such as inefficiencies in management and
operations, and inefficiencies in services. Today, far-reaching reforms are being
introduced worldwide to correct these problems. Such reforms have been made
necessary by budgetary restrictions to control excess subsidies, worsening government
finances, and a change in public opinion especially among taxpayers.

The act of deciding which is the better option—the public interest approach or the selfsupporting principle—is not up to the author, transit agencies, or private property developers, but
the general public under representation by their local and regional governments. According to
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Freemark (2012), privatization of railways has led to mixed results globally. Some countries
have experienced success while others have not, and some forms of privatization appeared to
work better than others. Saito (1997, p. 9) states that Japanese private railway companies’

aggressive management based on railway transport and community development was
sometimes criticized as giving priority to profits rather than public good. However, after
1970, as the financial difficulties of JNR and publicly-managed railways worsened, the
efficient and economically rational management of private railway companies gradually
received high recognition.

In retrospect, MTRC and Japanese private railways do seem capable of offering a high-quality
lifestyle within their developments and railway lines. The majority of MTRC is owned by the
Hong Kong government, preserving an incentive to provide services that benefits the public at
large. Even Japanese private railway companies have had to work closely with local and
regional governments when engaging in major property developments and transportation projects
due to high investment risk (Saito, 1997, p. 9). Also, the fares of Japanese railway companies
are strictly regulated by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport (MLIT) by way of
the full cost principle with a ceiling price and yardstick regulation (Mizutani & Nakamura, 2004,
pp. 33-34; Mizutani, 2010, pp. 12-17). This limits rail fares from increasing too quickly over
time. Shoji (n.d., p. 5) mentions that another regulation of private railway companies is the
“Railway Accounting Ordinance (Tetsudo kaikei kisoku) which controls the allocation of rail and
non-rail costs by making cross-subsidization unlawful.” This means that the railway section of a
company cannot be financially helped by the property development division of the company and
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vice versa. How this affects the behavior of companies is not deeply discussed or explained
clearly and is a topic that should be investigated more thoroughly.

In regard to joint development and value capture in North America, experience has shown that
the revenue generated by actual projects has not lived up to potential. The GAO (2010, p. 15)
found that “[a]lthough several transit agencies have generated millions of dollars in annual
revenue from joint development, this annual revenue is generally small when compared with an
agency’s annual operating expenses.” In fact, revenue from joint developments for the three
North American transit agencies with the most experience in joint developments—Los Angeles
Metro, Washington Metro, and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit—amounted to at most one
percent of their operating expenses in 2008 (GAO, 2010, pp. 15-16). What could be the cause of
this? One possible reason is that transit agencies are not allowed by law to own commercial
pieces of property. Washington Metro officials noted that they do not have the authority to own
land where condominiums are sold, and would rather opt to selling the land in that scenario
(GAO, 2010, p. 17). Another reason is that because of local resistance to increasing density,
joint developments cannot be built to their full potential and, thus, generate less revenue.
Finally, value capture was often discussed in the form of joint development, special assessment
districts, tax increment financing, and development impact fees (GAO, 2010, pp. 5-8); with these
methods, the added value of the land from accessibility to transit often goes to the local
government, rather than the transit agency (GAO, 2010, p. 17). Any amount that the transit
agency does receive is only a portion of that originally generated, while the rest is used for other
public infrastructure improvements (GAO, 2010, p. 17). These conditions limit transit’s ability
to benefit from value capture and reach its full potential in North America.
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4.6.

Land Use Implications in the U.S.

It is often argued that the low population density of the U.S. relative to other developed countries
is justification for not investing in transit. The argument is indeed a valid one, and suggests the
need for an institutional reform to change the status quo. It should be understood that transit
systems are by nature transmodal—a passenger using transit had to access the system using a
different mode, such as walking, bicycling, or driving (Walker, 2012, p. 15). Thus, the utility of
transit systems depends on the size and quality of its catchment area, or “the area within which
land use and urban design features and the ease and directness of access to the stop or station
both have a substantial impact [on] transit ridership” (APTA, 2009, p. 3). The general rule for
the size of a catchment area of transit stops is the area within one-quarter of a mile in every
direction from the transit stop, or a circle with a radius of one-fourth of a mile (APTA, 2009, p.
3). As the mobility of transit services offered by the transit stop or station increases, the radius
of the catchment area tends to increase as well because a faster service provides larger travel
time savings to passengers even if they had to walk a longer distance to reach the stop compared
to just walking all the way to their destinations. Hence, a regional transit stop or station will
have a catchment area of up to three miles) (APTA, 2009, p. 3). The catchment area can be a
limitation to transit’s competitiveness compared to automobiles, which have instant mobility and
near ubiquitous access. However, the catchment area is also an advantage for transit systems
because it provides an easy way to identify where transit operators can concentrate property
developments and population density. Suzuki, Cervero, and Iuchi (2013, p. 155) explain that
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[w]hat matters most for transit and land-use integration is not average population
densities but “articulated densities”—densities that are strategically distributed across
parts of a metropolitan area. The layout depicted in panel c of [Figure 19] is better suited
for mass transit than the one in panel a, even though the two forms have the same average
population density.

Figure 19. Articulated densities of urban developments. (Suzuki, Cervero, and Iuchi, 2013, p. 155).

Thus, extending the concept of articulated density along the entire length of a transit line that
runs across a city, metropolitan area, or even between regions, it would be in the transit
operator’s interests to plan and establish high density property developments on a “corridor”
basis. Figure 20 shows what the relative population density along a corridor might look like. As
Cervero (1998, pp. 189-190) and Chorus (2012, p. 350) write, planning for corridors would
involve establishing a variety of intense land uses evenly at transit stops. For example, on the
ends of its Toyoko line (i.e., Shibuya Station in Tokyo and Sakuragicho in Yokohama),

Tokyu anchored these two terminal stations with high-rise commercial centers (featuring
Tokyu’s own department stores) and attracted several prominent university campuses to
intermediate stations. These commercial centers, along with the universities, have
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produced a steady bidirectional flow of passengers, ensuring efficient train operations
(Cervero, 1998, pp. 189-190).

Density

Relative Population Density

Transit Stop

Distance

Figure 20. Population density along a transit corridor. Produced by the author.

With the concept of station area corridor planning in mind, the transit operator would want to
identify potential corridors that have room for the bus or railway right-of-way and station areas
that have room for high-density mixed-use developments. At the same time, however, in the
U.S. it would be particularly important to choose places that people would expect to find density
and intense land uses in order to avoid what may be perceived as an attack on the suburban
lifestyle. As Dimitriou explains, suburbia is directly influenced by a

drive to preserve natural open space . . . . Natural open space is the sacred cow of the
suburbs, and the design of suburban developments is intended to integrate buildings with
a natural setting. This stems from people’s desire to live in a big house with a bucolic
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countryside and yet still have easy access to the leisure amenities and work opportunities
in the city (2001, p. 18).

As follows, the effort to fit denser station area developments within the existing urban and
suburban fabric of metropolitan areas in the U.S. to support transit would have to be done
without destroying the bucolic sense of suburbia or ruthlessly rebuilding the existing
infrastructure and housing developments in the same way that highways did in the mid-20th
Century (Norton, 2008, p. 241). The effort would have to be done by

pattern[ing] urban growth into a series of dense centers surrounding the traditional city
center . . . . With this approach, we can reduce the dependence on the private automobile
rather than force it’s (sic) elimination, and we can greatly improve the quality of place
through mixing uses and defining public places (Dimitriou, 2001, p. 21).

This idea comes straight from the Garden Cities concept proposed by Ebenezer Howard in 1902
(Dimitriou, 2001, p. 21). In the context of industrial London, the “Garden City” was designed to
be a series of new towns located outside and away from the congestion and pollution of the city
center. The goal was to provide a “perfect union between the countryside and the town”
(Dimitriou, 2001, p. 22).

As such, Dimitriou identifies existing strip commercial centers in American metropolitan areas
as ideal places to begin densifying suburbia (2001, p. 22). This seems appropriate, since firstly,
strip commercial centers are places where suburbanites would expect to experience the qualities
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of high-density places, such as noise, pedestrian presence, commerce, and congestion (Dimitriou,
2001, p. 23). By increasing the density of strip commercial centers, one is not initiating a major
shift in land use patterns that disturbs people’s identification with their current neighborhoods,
but simply increasing the intensity of what already exists. Secondly, strip commercial centers
are generally auto-oriented, have large parking areas, and accommodate “shopping centers,
office blocks, big box retail, and sometimes, medium-density housing” (Dimitriou, 2001, p. 13).
In terms of urban design, these land uses have great potential to be reoriented as pedestrian
public spaces as they provide the necessary space to do so. Finally, strip commercial centers
tend to be “located at the intersection of major arterials, and [are] most often composed of a
string of commercially zoned lots that are each independently developed by private developers”
(Dimitriou, 2001, p. 22). As Walker notes, these thoroughfares, also called boulevards, are
abundant in car-oriented cities and are perfect for providing the space and mobility that would
allow transit to be accommodated quickly and offer competitive service within suburban areas
(2012, p. 206).

In response to the common claim that metropolitan areas in the U.S. are too low in population
density or land-use intensity to justify providing transit services, a viable plan to densify
suburban areas was provided. The plan would encompass creating clusters of dense commercial
and residential land uses within existing suburban areas on a “corridor” basis for transit lines.
This involves 1) identifying arterials that provide the space and mobility necessary to support
competitive transit service, 2) and identifying key locations, such as strip commercial centers,
that can be redeveloped into denser TODs that provide the necessary ridership to justify transit
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service. The plan provides a basis for developing new institutional arrangements to proliferate
the use of transit in U.S. metropolitan areas.
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5. Conclusions and Findings
While public transportation remains a small portion of total travel in the U.S., it is gaining
ridership in real terms and provides an important relief of congestion and other positive
externalities for urban areas. The increase in ridership is a result of population growth, economic
growth, higher gasoline prices, advertising of public transportation by transit agencies, and land
use policies to encourage high-density TOD near transit stations. Transit agencies have met this
increase in ridership by providing more services and expanding their existing systems, but have
also been financially strained by increased operations and capital expenditures. Despite strong
financial commitment in the form of operating subsidies and capital grants from all levels of
government to support transit since 1998, the operating deficits have limited progress in
increases of transit service and network expansions. Thus, there was a need to find an
institutional model that allows transit agencies to compete with other modes of transportation,
including operating with positive operating margins and changing land use patterns to entice
greater patronage.

R + P, a system that has been in use by Japanese private railway companies and Hong Kong’s
MTRC for decades, provides an institutionally different model from that of the U.S. R + P,
which involves transit operators to also assume the role of station area master planner, property
developer, and property investor, allows transit operators to receive income other than farebox
and increasingly constrained tax revenues. Transit operators using R + P are able to realize
positive operating margins while providing valuable transit service without straining
governments of limited funds. Because of the inherent features of R + P, transit operators are
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able to efficiently manage the dynamic between transportation and land use on their systems, and
are encouraged to maintain a “state of good repair” of their systems to retain ridership. For
patrons, this has resulted in a convenient and high-quality lifestyle that is both financially and
environmentally sustainable.

R + P differs from the U.S. model of transit operations and capital funding in several respects.
The U.S. model emphasizes coordination between separate entities that carry out the roles of
transit operations, master planning of station areas, property development, and property
investment. R + P integrates these roles into one entity and realizes lower transaction costs
during the planning of these roles, resulting in a more holistically designed transportation system
and TOD. R + P is based on commercial principles, which transit agencies in the U.S. either are
not authorized to conduct or do not have extensive experience with.

R + P holds important lessons for transit agencies and policymakers in the U.S. Efforts to
expand services and transit networks can be benefitted greatly if R + P is adopted by U.S. transit
agencies, and allow the American public to enjoy the many benefits of public transportation.
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6. Recommendations
Upon the findings of this paper, it is recommended in regard to policy that:

Transit agencies in the U.S.:
o Actively adopt a commercial and entrepreneurial approach to search for new
ways to raise revenue to support transit operations and capital expenditures.
o Establish an internal real-estate staff or office.
o Establish an internal urban design staff or office to master plan station areas.
o Coordinate with local and regional governments to develop corridor plans at
the metropolitan scale.
Policymakers at the local and regional level:
o Allow transit agencies to engage in commercial activities and own
commercial pieces of property.
o Allow transit agencies to take the lead in master planning station areas.
o Allow transit agencies to buy, develop, manage, and invest in property.
o Allow transit agencies to engage in land readjustment, or parcel assembly, in
coordination with landowners, local authorities, and property developers.
o Establish a method to regulate ticket fares.
o Coordinate with transit agencies to develop corridor plans at the metropolitan
scale.
Policymakers at the federal level:
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o Provide guidance on how R + P, or elements thereof, can feasibly be adopted in
the U.S.
o Provide funding or other financial incentives for R + P pilot projects.

For further research, it is recommended that property rights in the U.S., Hong Kong, and Japan
be studied and compared to identify any potential impediments to R + P in the U.S. In particular,
the issue of condemnation of private property for an R + P project should be discussed to explore
the constitutionality of such an action. What should also be studied is the Railway Accounting
Ordinance (Tetsudo kaikei kisoku) which limits cross-subsidization between railway, property
development, and other operations of Japanese private railway companies. It seems that such a
regulation prevents the basic advantage of R + P, which allows transit operators to have their
transit operations financially supported by services that benefit from transit. A discussion in the
Japanese context of this issue was brief and inconclusive, and there was no mention by the
literature of a similar law in Hong Kong, suggesting that MTRC can engage in crosssubsidization of operations. Fare regulation is another topic that should be investigated.
Privatization brings up the concern of whether a private entity can adequately provide the public
service of transportation affordably and equitably to all segments of the population in a manner
comparable to that of a public provider. In Japan, fare prices are stringently regulated by MLIT,
and any increase in fares must be justified. The resulting fare price must fall within an
acceptable range of fare prices of other comparable transit providers. In Hong Kong, although
there was no discussion of regulation of fare prices, since the central government owns over
three-fourths of MTRC, it is assumed that fare prices are set to be affordable to most of the
population. A discussion of what concessionary relationships may be possible with R + P would
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also be helpful. While this paper took the approach that existing transit agencies could engage in
new operations to increase revenue and patronage (i.e., master planning, property development
and property management), another approach would be for transit agencies to act as an asset
holder of the transit infrastructure and invite companies to operate trains and engage in station
area development in exchange for a portion of future revenues. For land use in the U.S., the
viability of introducing R + P on a metropolitan scale should be looked into. If multiple transit
operators become engaged in R + P within the same metropolitan area, rules for fair play and
cooperation should be adopted as early as possible to institute them into the behavior of the
operators with as little conflict as possible.

62

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

References
American Public Transportation Association. (2009). Defining transit areas of influence.
Retrieved July 25, 2015, from
http://www.apta.com/resources/standards/Documents/APTA%20SUDS-UD-RP-00109.pdf
—. (2015). 2015 Public transportation fact book appendix A: Historical tables. Retrieved July
20, 2015, from http://www.apta.com/resources/statistics/Documents/FactBook/2015APTA-Fact-Book-Appendix-A.pdf
Becker, S., Bernstein, S., Young, L. (2013). The new real estate mantra: Location near public
transportation. Chicago, IL: The Center for Neighborhood Technology.
Cabanatuan, M. (2014). S.F. Central Subway’s big dig done. Retrieved July 7, 2014, from
http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Big-dig-done-on-S-F-s-Central-Subway5576650.php
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority. (2014). Transit oriented development (TOD)
program. Retrieved July 24, 2014, from
http://www.soundtransit.org/Documents/pdf/projects/tod/20140423_RPT_TOD.pdf
Cervero, R. (1999). Problems of an automobile-dependent world. C. Nuworsoo. (Ed.).
Transportation, theory, policy and practice. Oakland, CA: Oden Readers.
—. (1998). The Transit metropolis. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Cervero, R. & Murakami, J. (2008). Rail + Property Development: A model of sustainable
transit finance and urbanism. Retrieved July 21, 2014, from
http://www.its.berkeley.edu/publications/UCB/2008/VWP/UCB-ITS-VWP-2008-5.pdf

63

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

Chorus, P. (2012). Station area developments in Tokyo and what the Randstad can learn from
it. Retrieved July 26, 2015, from http://dare.uva.nl/document/2/145884
Cranor, D. (2011). Funding Amtrak is more cost-effective than subsidizing roads. Retrieved
July 7, 2014, from http://greatergreaterwashington.org/post/12208/funding-amtrak-ismore-cost-effective-than-subsidizing-roads/
Dimitriou, G. J. (2001). Suburban revisions: Redesigning suburban strip malls. Retrieved July
5, 2015, from http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/65724/49554951MIT.pdf?sequence=2
Dutzik, T., Inglis, J., & Baxandall, P. (2014). Millennials in motion: Changing travel habits of
young Americans and the implications for public policy. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from
http://www.uspirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/Millennials%20in%20Motion%20USPIRG.
pdf
EU Directive 91/440. (2014). In Wikipedia. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EU_Directive_91/440
Ephemeron 1. (2008). Berlin Hauptbahnhof. Retrieved July 25, 2014, from
https://www.flickr.com/photos/28888420@N07/3277880381/
Fishman, R. (2005). The Fifth migration. Journal of the American Planning Association, 71(4),
357-366.
Forecast-Chart.com. (2012). Japanese yen currency exchange rate forecast. Retrieved July 12,
2014, from http://www.forecast-chart.com/usd-japanese-yen.html
Freemark, Y. (2012). Revisiting privatization in intercity rail. Retrieved July 25, 2014, from
http://www.thetransportpolitic.com/2012/10/09/revisiting-privatization-in-intercity-rail/

64

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

Giuliano, G. (1995). Land use impacts of transportation investments: Highway and transit. In
S. Hanson (Ed.), The Geography of urban transportation (pp. 305-341). New York, NY:
The Guilford Press.
Harriet, T., Poku, K., & Emmanuel, A.K. (2013). An Assessment of traffic congestion and its
effect on productivity in urban Ghana. International Journal of Business and Social
Science, 4(3), 225-234. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from
http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol_4_No_3_March_2013/25.pdf
Hokachung. (n.d.). MTR TUC (13). Retrieved July 25, 2014, from
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/MTR_TUC_%2813%29.JPG
Hong Kong MTR system map. (2009). Retrieved July 28, 2014, from http://www.funjapan.com/images/traffic/Tokyo_metro_map_kai.jpg
Kimura, N. (2013). Keeping Tokyo on the move. Retrieved July 24, 2014, from
http://www.apta.com/mc/rail/program/Documents/KimuraN_Keeping-Tokyo-on-theMove.pdf
Mass Transit Railway Corporation. (2014). Service hours. Retrieved July 24 ,2014, from
http://www.mtr.com.hk/en/customer/services/train_service_index.html
Mizutani, F. (2010). Organization and regulation of the rail industry in Japan. Retrieved July
25, 2014, from
http://fsr.eui.eu/Documents/Presentations/Transport/2010/1ERailTRFpresentation/10111
5MIZUTANIFumotoshi.pdf
Mizutani, F. & Nakamura, K. (2004). The Japanese experience with railway restructuring.
Retrieved July 20, 2014, from http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10195.pdf

65

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

MTR Corporation. (2014). In Wikipedia. Retrieved July 28, 2014, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MTR_Corporation
National Transit Database. (2013). Transit profiles: Top 50 agencies. Retrieved July 7, 2014
from
http://www.ntdprogram.gov/ntdprogram/pubs/top_profiles/2012/Transit%20Profiles%20
Top%2050%20Agencies.pdf
Newman, P. & Kenworthy J. (2006). Urban design to reduce automobile dependence. Opolis,
2(1), 35-52.
http://www.naturaledgeproject.net/documents/newmankenworthyurbandesign.pdf
Neff, J. & Dickens, M. (2013). 2013 Public transportation fact book. Retrieved July 6, 2014,
from http://www.apta.com/resources/statistics/Documents/FactBook/2013-APTA-FactBook.pdf
Norton, P. D. (2008). Fighting traffic: The Dawn of the motor age in the American city.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Richards, G. (2013). BART extension to San Jose: Heavy lifting about to begin. Retrieved July
7, 2014, from http://www.mercurynews.com/traffic/ci_23004302/bart-extension-sanjose-heavy-lifting-about-begin
Saito, T. (1997). Japanese private railway companies and their business diversification.
Retrieved July 12, 2014, from http://jrtr.net/jrtr10/pdf/f02_sai.pdf
Schrank, D., Eisele, B., & Lomax, T. (2012). Texas Transportation Institute’s 2012 Urban
mobility report. Retrieved July 22, 2015, from
http://d2dtl5nnlpfr0r.cloudfront.net/tti.tamu.edu/documents/mobility-report-2012.pdf

66

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

Shibuya Station West Exit Bus Terminal. (n.d.). Retrieved July 25, 2014, from
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/00/Shibuya_Station_West_Exit_Bus_
terminal.jpg
Shoji, K. (n.d.). Lessons from Japanese experiences of roles of public and private sectors in
urban transport. Retrieved July 24, 2014, from http://jrtr.net/jrtr29/pdf/f12_sho.pdf
Small, K. A. (1997). Economics and urban transportation policy in the United States.
Retrieved July 7, 2014, from http://www.uctc.net/papers/219.pdf
Suzuki, H., Cervero, R., & Iuchi, K. (2013). Transforming cities with transit: Transit and landuse integration for sustainable urban development. Retrieved July 22, 2014, from
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12233/NonAsciiFileName
0.pdf?sequence=1
Suzuki, H., Murakami, J., Hong, Y., & Tamayose, B. (2015). Financing transit-oriented
development with land values. Retrieved July 24, 2015, from http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/01/14/00040648
4_20150114091425/Rendered/PDF/936860PUB00ISB0TransportDevLV0final.pdf
Tang, B.S., Chiang, Y.H., Baldwin, A.N., & Yeung, C.W. (2005). Integration of property and
railway development: An institutional economics analysis. Retrieved June 27, 2014,
from http://www.hkis.org.hk/ufiles/200506-bstang.pdf
Tillier, C. (2009). Future transbay? Retrieved July 25, 2014, from http://caltrainhsr.blogspot.com/2009/06/future-transbay.html
Tokyo Metro. (2014). In Wikipedia. Retrieved July 24, 2014, from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tokyo_metro

67

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

Tokyo Metro map kai. (2013). Retrieved July 28, 2014, from http://www.funjapan.com/images/traffic/Tokyo_metro_map_kai.jpg
Tokyu Group. (2013). Status of property ownership around Shibuya Station. Retrieved July 25,
2014, from
http://www.tokyu.co.jp/ir/upload_file/ENlibrary_06_02/9005_2010060919101403_P01_.
pdf
United States. Department of Labor. Bureau of Labor Statistics. (2014). Consumer price index
data from 1913 to 2014. Retrieved July 12, 2014, from
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/consumer-price-index-and-annualpercent-changes-from-1913-to-2008/
United States. Department of Transportation. (2010). Transportation’s role in reducing U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions. Retrieved July 5, 2015, from
http://ntl.bts.gov/lib/32000/32700/32779/DOT_Climate_Change_Report_-_April_2010__Volume_1_and_2.pdf
United States. Department of Transportation. Federal Transit Administration. (2006). Transit
noise and vibration impact assessment. Retrieved May 13, 2015, from
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTA_Noise_and_Vibration_Manual.pdf
United States. Department of Transportation. Federal Transit Administration. (2013). Federal
Transit Administration guidance on joint development (Advisory Circular 7050.1).
Retrieved July 1, 2014, from http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/2013-0307_Proposed_Joint_Development_Circular_(FINAL)_(2).pdf

68

Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Urban Transit and Intercity Railways

Seitu Coleman

―. (2014). Planning for transit-supportive development: A practitioner’s guide (Executive
Summary). Retrieved July 12, 2014, from
http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTA_Report_No._0052.pdf
United States. Department of Transportation. Research and Innovative Technology
Administration. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. (2012). Table 3-35: Transportation
expenditures by mode and level of government from own funds, fiscal year. Retrieved
July 5, 2015, from
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation
_statistics/html/table_03_35.html
—. (2014). Table 1-40: U.S. passenger-miles (millions). Retrieved July 12, 2014, from
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national_transportation
_statistics/html/table_01_40.html
United States. Government Accountability Office. (2010). Federal role in value capture
strategies for transit is limited, but additional guidance could help clarify policies.
Retrieved June 25, 2014, from http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/308012.pdf
Walker, J. (2010). Transit’s role in “sprawl repair.” Retrieved July 5, 2015, from
http://www.humantransit.org/2010/11/transits-role-in-sprawl-repair.html
—. (2012). Human transit: How clearer thinking about public transit can enrich our
communities and our lives. Washington, DC: Island Press.
Wolfe, C. R., & Symington, P. (2009). Urban centers and transit oriented development in
Washington State. Seattle, WA: The Runstad Center for Real Estate Studies.

69

